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INTRODUCTION
The analysis of Latin American business cycles and, in particular, that of crises episodes tends to follow, perhaps inadvertently, the boom/bust approach developed by the Austrian School of economics and associated in particular with the work and ideas of F.A. Hayek, which assumes that monetary shocks cause deviations from the optimal path, a methodology that was revived in more recent years by the New Classical and Real Business Cycles schools. 1 According to this approach, the triggering factor in the cycle is excess credit and liquidity. In the case of Latin American countries, the origin of the cycle is often traced to a surge in financial inflows. Central to this view is the belief that the origin and nature of the bust (contraction) is to be found in the boom (expansion). As such, the more pronounced the upswing (boom), the harsher the following and inevitable contraction. From here, it follows that avoiding boom conditions entails applying restrictive economic policies during the expansion in the business cycle, including reigning in government expenditures and fostering public savings.
Building on the structuralist and post-Keynesian tradition, we argue that the boom and bust view is inherently contradictory because its policy recommendations tend to produce exactly the type of drastic and unwarranted fluctuations that it seeks to avoid. In fact, we show that once the binding character of the external sector is understood and introduced into the analysis, a restrictive fiscal policy aimed at avoiding a "bust" may simply cause a process of debt accumulation in the private sector. Moreover and more importantly, we sustain at a more general level that the key to understanding business cycles, crises, and their impact lies in the analysis of the composition and structure of aggregate demand. We illustrate these points by focusing on one of the most systemic crisis that has affected Latin American economies in the past half a century, namely the Global Crisis (2007) (2008) (2009) , and by analyzing its differentiated impact on Central and South America. 2 We argue that the brunt of the effects of the crisis were felt in Central America mainly due to the rising current account deficit whose mirror image was the accumulation of private debt once the fiscal accounts were kept in (or near) balance. The impact of the crisis forced a private sector deleveraging process that had devastating consequences on investment, output, and the financial sector. In contrast to the boom-bust view the chain of causation of our analysis runs from deleveraging to the real economy and then to liquidity and finance, while also suggesting that the external constraint imposed by the current account does not, in general, allow for rates of growth compatible with catching up with advanced economies. On the other hand, South America was not, for the most part, as affected mainly due to the favorable performance of its external sector, which allowed the private sector balance to register a surplus. This is not to say that growth has resulted exclusively from the external conditions in South America, but that over the last boom, the external constraint was not binding.
We attribute this differentiated impact to the fact that under a contractionary fiscal stance, the type of growth regime followed by Central America, based on private debt accumulation, was much more vulnerable to this particular type of crisis than that followed by South American countries based on a large commodity export-led growth, which provided space for domestic demand and increasing social transfers.
The paper is divided into six sections. The first discusses the boom-bust view of the business cycles and crises and its policy implications. The second section describes the impact of the Global Crisis on Latin America and its sub regions (South and Central America). The third section develops a macroeconomic model based on Kaleckian and Minskyian insights for the analysis of the business cycle and crises. The fourth and fifth sections provide empirical evidence in the case of the Global Crisis for Central and South America that exemplify some of the key features of the model. These sections also show that contrary to the boom/bust view of the cycle, credit is endogenous to demand conditions. The final reflections are found in the conclusion.
THE BOOM AND BUST VIEW OF BUSINESS CYCLES AND CRISES
The great majority of Latin American economists, independently of their political view point, see the business cycle as a succession of booms and busts around an exogenously determined and optimal trend. The origins of the boom and bust view can be traced to the Austrian Business Cycle theory and, more precisely, to Clément Juglar (Wicksell 1898 , Schumpeter 1939 , and Hayek 1933 , and has been revived in the works of New Classical authors like Lucas (1981) and by Kydland and Prescott (1982) . 3 In a nutshell, it sustains that the intensity of the recession/contraction in an economic cycle is directly proportionate to the previous expansionary phase. The more pronounced the expansion, the sharper the recession will be. The recession is thus a product of the expansion.
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From here follows the most important conclusion of this view, which says that contractions are inevitable and necessary. Furthermore, contractions can even be conceived as being desirable, as illustrated by the introduction of liquidation as a sub-phase within the economic cycle associated with this approach. 5 Economic policy cannot suppress contractions, but it can prevent their development into busts. Since contractions and also crises are incubated during expansion periods, crisis management is tantamount to expansion management, and cooling the economy during the booms to avoid the excesses of the cycle is seen as part of good macroeconomic policy.
The literature on the subject does not provide any numerical or quantitative threshold for defining an expansion or a boom. Nonetheless, this phase of the cycle is generally identified, as in Austrian business cycle theory, with greater overall liquidity conditions. This is characterized mainly by credit growth above trend ("excess credit") for both developed and developing countries. In addition, in the case of developing countries, booms are also associated with increased and large financial inflows. 6 In fact, the chain of causation in a boom period proceeds 3 Some of the authors emphasize monetary shocks, while others stress real disturbances to the optimal trend. The Keynesian Revolution was, to some extent, developed as a reaction to this tradition, and led to a view of the cycle in which trend and fluctuations result endogenously from the interactions of autonomous demand decisions and the adjustment of productive capacity. It is important to note that the trend itself, that is, potential output, is endogenous and demand driven. See for example, McCombie and Thirlwall (1994) and Bortis (1996) . 4 Or as put by Juglar: "the only cause of depression is prosperity" (apud Schumpeter 1927, p.29) . 5 Liquidation was one the phases of the cycle identified by Juglar and became associated with the Austrian theory of the business cycle (e.g. Schumpeter 1939; Hayek 1933) and with passive policies adopted by governments before the Great Depression and the Keynesian Revolution. Eichengreen (1999, pp. 8-12 ) defines it as: "… liquidationism, according to which business cycle downturns served the Darwinian function of weeding out the weak enterprises least well adapted to a dynamic economy." 6 Mendoza and Terrones (2008, p. 26) argue that large financial inflows precede "credit booms" in developing economies, whereas in developed economies, these are preceded by productivity gains or domestic financial reforms. Within the boom-bust tradition, placing the focus on financial inflows as the cause of the boom has led to emphasize "sudden stops" as the triggering mechanism of the bust. In the literature, sudden stops occur concurrently with balance of payments or currency crises. Sudden stops generally involve a reduction in the current account deficit in the year of occurrence of the sudden stop or one year after. As will become clearer in the text, we agree that a sharp decline in financial inflows can be part and, indeed, is an important part of the explanation of the business cycle and crises; however, sudden stops are not necessarily related to a balance of payments crisis.
from increased financial flows to greater credit, liquidity, and spending. In the transmission mechanism, the proponents of this view highlight the fact that the pro-cyclical behavior of government expenditure is a key contributor to the generation of booms and, hence, by the logic of the approach to the occurrence and the intensity of the following and necessary contraction.
Thus, the often quoted aphorism: "contractions are not managed in the downward phase of the cycle but in the upward phase of the economic cycle." 7 Note, furthermore, that within this approach, pro-cyclicality in the upswing has a clear cost not only because the intensity of the upturn determines that of the downturn, but also because a pro-cyclical stance in the upturn prevents undertaking a counter cyclical stance in the downturn. Hence, counter cyclicality in the downward phase of the cycle is predated on counter cyclicality in the upturn. Or, to put it in a more straightforward manner, what in mainstream constitutes a counter cyclical approach to business is, thus, ultimately reduced to counter cyclicality in the upswing.
According to a minority opinion within this boom-bust view, counter cyclicality amounts to the implementation of capital management techniques to tame and administer financial inflows. But, by far, the consensus opinion is centered on exercising restriction on government expenditures or increasing fiscal savings in the upswing of the cycle. Furthermore, its impact will depend on the composition of aggregate demand. For more on the conventional view, see Calvo (1998) , Calvo et al. (2004) , and Izquierdo et. al. (2008) . See Jorda and Aliber (2005) for a recent analysis of the importance of credit in boom and bust. Perez Caldentey and Vernengo (2011) show that the boom and bust view has a long tradition in the understanding of cycles in Latin America. 7 Evidence presented by Kaminsky et al. (2004) , for the period 1960-2003 for 104 countries, including developed and developing countries worldwide, shows that the correlation coefficient between the cyclical component of real GDP and real central government expenditure is positive (pro-cyclical) for the majority of countries under study, especially for developing countries. This is often used as an argument in favor of promoting austerity during the booms. 8 In this regard, the boom-bust view is akin to what Tobin (1974) termed the cyclical mentality to describe economic policy in the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, where the function of the federal government is the moderation of cyclical swings. 9 The arguments underscoring the adoption of rules are well known. Rules improve the credibility of institutions and the reputation of policy makers. Institutions have clear objectives; namely: a credible policy is one for which agents expect that it will have its intended effects. Reputation is based on known preferences by the public and preferences From a comparative sub-regional perspective, the effects of the crisis are far from homogeneous and were felt with much greater intensity in Central America than in South America. On average, the rate of growth in 2009 plunged by -1.5 percent, on average, for Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua), and -1 percent if that are expected to remain invariant. Note that the majority of countries in Latin America that have adopted fiscal rules also have in place a monetary rule whether it be inflation targeting (Chile, Colombia, Peru) or hard peg rule (Ecuador, Panama). 10 The crisis originated in the developed world and the impact on output was felt with greater force in advanced economies than in emerging and developing economies. The rate of growth in the former group declined from 0.5 percent in 2008 to -4.2 percent in 2009. In the latter case, the rate of growth of output declined from 6.3 percent to 2.8 percent for the same period. In addition, when seen from a historical perspective, the Global Crisis was for Central
American countries one of the sharpest contractions on record since the 1960s, only superseded by that of the 1980s Debt Crisis (-3.0 and -3.3 percent in 1979 and 1982) . Contrarily for South America, the Great Recession can hardly be categorized as a major economic event or on par with the crisis episodes that have affected this group of countries since the 1980s, including the Debt (1980s), Tequila (1994 Tequila ( -1995 , Asian (1997 ), Brazilian (1999 ), Russian (1999 , and
Argentinean (2002) crises. South America, on average, registered negative rates of growth in 1982-1983, 1999, and 2002 (-3 .6 percent, -2.4 percent, and -0.7 percent, on average, respectively) reflecting the impact of the Debt, Asian, Brazilian, Russian, and Argentinean crises.
Rate of growth of GDP
South America Central America 
12
The United States is also the main provider of remittances, which averaged 3 percent, 6 percent, and 9 percent of GDP on average for Central America in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, and also of financial flows which are essential to fund their continual current account imbalances.
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12 As a point of reference for the same year, Mexican exports to the United States represented 80 percent of its total exports. Latin America and the Caribbean is the second market of importance representing 29 percent, 43 percent, 42 percent, 29 percent, 44 percent, and 21 percent for the same countries for the same year. In the case of the Dominican Republic, Latin America and the Caribbean is the destination of 23 percent of its exports. 13 Available evidence for the period running from 1980 to 2010 shows that the current account was in the deficit on average for Central America increasing from US$ 3 to 18 billion dollars. A closer inspection of the data by country level shows that only El Salvador, Guatemala, and Panama registered surpluses in their current account. Both El Salvador and Guatemala recorded a positive result in a single year throughout the entire period (1980 and 2004, respectively) . Panama posited surpluses in the years 1983, 1985, and 1994 and the period 1987-1990. This is reflected in the fact that the Central American business cycle and its turning points are closely related to that of the United States. This is shown in Table 1 , which displays the correlation coefficients of real GDP cycles using a Baxter-King filter between Latin
American countries and the United States for the period 1960-2010, 1970-2010, 1980-2010, and 1990-2010 . The correlation coefficients for Central American countries (in bold) are, for the majority, statistically significant for the different periods considered.
14 Note: * and ** denote significance at the 95 percent and 90 percent level of confidence. The statistical significance of the correlation coefficient was determined on the basis of the formula:
where r is the simple correlation coefficient and n the number of observations.  follows a student-t distribution. The Baxter-King filter was applied on the real GDP series (constant US$ 2000) in level terms. Source: Authors' own on the basis of World Development Indicators and Global Finance. World Bank (2012) This relatively minor effect of the crisis on South America, both in regional and historical comparative terms, requires an explanation, since in fact the nature and transmission mechanisms 14 The correlation coefficients are statistically significant in all periods for Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Guatemala. In the case of Honduras, the coefficients are significant for all but the last period. In the cases of Nicaragua, the results are more erratic (this also applies to Panama and the Dominican Republic).
of the Great Recession (2008) (2009) ) share many similarities with those of other past major episodes including the Debt (1980s), Tequila (1994 Tequila ( -1995 , Asian (1997 Asian ( -1998 , Russian (1999 ), Brazilian (1999 , and Argentinean (2002) crises.
The Great Recession was a systemic crisis, as was the Debt Crisis episode. In both instances, all Latin American countries witnessed a deceleration or outright contraction of economic activity. The Global Crisis involved, as in all of the above cases, a greater contraction in investment than in the other components of aggregate demand, including consumption, government spending, and exports. In fact, a comparative exercise taking into account the Debt, Tequila, Asian-Brazilian-Russian and Argentina crises shows that the rate of growth of gross capital formation fell on average by 14 percent in real terms, whereas GDP growth contracted by -3.8 percent (see Table 2 ). As in all the other episodes, the countries affected by a crisis witnessed a decline in financial flows. On average, available evidence for the Debt, Tequila, Asian-Brazilian-Russian and Argentina crises show that financial flows declined from 5.0 percent to -5.7 percent of GDP from the pre-crisis to the crisis period (see Table 2 ). Depending on the particular episode, the decline in flows reflected to a greater or lesser extent the behavior of short-term, portfolio equity or long-term foreign direct investment. The drying up of external finance is mirrored in all cases by a reduction in domestic credit availability. The decline in external finance was also accompanied, as in some episodes, with a decline in the terms of trade.
From our point of view, the differential impact of the Global Crisis on Central American and South American economies can be explained by the differences in the growth strategies in the period preceding the onset of the crisis. We argue, in particular, that during this period both Central America and South America pursued profit-driven growth strategies that were dependent on the preceding liberalization strategies associated with the integration into external markets.
However, there was an important difference in the way the strategy was made operational.
Central America's domestic demand was debt-driven, and the external constraint was eased by "exporting people," that is, by remittances from immigrants and exports of "maquilas," in turn, dependent on cheap labor. Contrarily, South America's regime was associated to the expansion of wages and social transfers, with an export-led boom that depended on favorable terms-of-trade to ease the balance of payments constraint (Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo 2010).
We are of the opinion that these development strategies have important vulnerabilities that make them unsustainable over time and prone to eventual break-ups and crises. Nonetheless, in this particular case, given the nature of the Great Recession and of the response of developed countries and of the international community, a private debt-led regime had a higher degree of exposure to the impact of the crisis than one sustained on commodity export-led growth. As it will become clearer in the development of our argument, a debt-led growth accumulation is vulnerable, particularly under a contractionary fiscal policy stance, because it makes an economy highly dependent on the availability of access to foreign finance. A drying up of external finance, as was the case during the Global Crisis, can lead to a process of deleveraging, contraction in investment, output, credit demand, and distress in the financial sector. In this respect, the crisis in Thereafter, all indices recovered in V-shape, recording growth rates of 17 percent, 12 percent, 24 percent, and 32 percent, respectively, from January 2010 until July 2011.
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Note that our position implies that crises, their characteristics, and their impact cannot be treated as identical over time. These must be understood and analyzed from a "historical time"
perspective. Indeed they are events whose effects and consequences depend as much on the predominant transmission mechanism as on the growth regime prevalent at the time of the crisis.
A MACROECONOMIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF PROFIT-SEEKING REGIMES
To analyze the differences/similarities between a profit-debt and profit-export regime and its application to the Latin American case, it is useful to start by laying out a simple Macroeconomic Accounting Model (MAM). 16 The MAM starts with the generation of savings by the different agents that comprise an economy: households (hs), businesses (b), government (g), the financial system (fs), and the foreign/external sector (es). Formally:
Where * denotes foreign and e is the nominal exchange rate.
Savings of households (ܵ ) are equal to wages (W) plus transfers of businesses, government, and the external sector (ܴܶ ǡ ܴܶ ǡܴܶ ௦ , respectively) minus consumption, the payment of taxes, and interests ‫ܥ(‬ , Γ ǡ‫ܲܫ‬ ǡ‫ܲܫ‬ , respectively). Savings of firms (ܵ ) equal to profits (Π ୠ ) minus transfers (ܴܶ ), taxes (Γ ), and the payments of interests on internal and external debt ‫ܲܫ(‬ ǡ ‫ܲܫ݁‬ * ). External sector savings equal leakages (imports ‫ܯ(‬ ሻǡ interest payments on external debt, ሺ‫ܲܫ‬ * ‫ܲܫ‬ * ) and profit repatriation ሺߙȫ ୠ ) minus injections (exports (ܺ) and unilateral transfers or remittances ሺܴܶ ௦ )).The financial sector has zero savings as it exactly balances its income (interest payments to households, businesses, and government ‫ܲܫ(‬ ǡ‫ܲܫ‬ ǡ‫ܲܫ‬ ) with the issue of liabilities ( ).
16 This follows the model of Taylor (1998) .
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Combining equations (1) through (5), we obtain the resource balance for the economy.
That is:
Postulating the equality between savings and investment (S=I), and assuming that investment is undertaken by householdsሺ‫ܫ‬ ), businesses ‫ܫ(‬ ), and the governmentሺ‫ܫ‬ ), that is:
Substituting in (6):
From equation (8) we obtain the equation for profits:
Rearranging terms:
Deducting taxes (Γ) on both sides of (11) yields the profit after tax (Π ௧ )equation:
Where ‫ܩ‬ ൌ ‫ܥ‬ ‫ܫ‬ Ǥ Dividing both sides of equation (11) by GDP and summing up the investment terms, 17 we obtain:
17 The solution to the macro model presented in terms of the profit rate Π follows Kalecki (1954, pp.45-52) . According to Kalecki (Ibid., p, 49) , gross profits net of taxes are equal to the sum of gross investment plus the export surplus, budget deficit and capitalist consumption minus worker savings. Minsky (1982, pp. 38-44) , builds on Kalecki with a similar equation. See, also, Minsky (1986, pp. 141-156) . See also Felipe and Vernengo (2002-3) .
Household flows Government deficit Business investment
External balance
By definition, the current account deficit must be equal to the financial account of the balance of payments plus the variation in international reserves, that is:
Thus, the profit equation can alternatively be expressed as a function of household consumption out of wages, the government deficit, financial inflows and investment:
In this formulation, profits (ߨሻincrease as a result of greater household consumption out of wages, the government deficit, financial flows, and investment. Profits are the result of the process of growth, and can be obtained by higher rates of growth resulting from higher consumption associated with a wage-led expansion, a public spending driven boom, and by private debt expansion fueled by external financial inflows. Note that a consumption boom could also take place if domestic private debt increased, but this is less likely in Latin American countries with less developed financial sectors. Further, it is important to note that in Kaleckian fashion, profits are the result of the process of capitalist accumulation, that is, profits are the object of the desire of the system, and for that reason might refer to the economic regime as profit-seeking, but it is not generally true that investment is driven by profits, since investment is derived by demand. In other words, we assume, again following Kalecki, that investment follows some form of the accelerator and is dependent on income expansion.
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DEBT AND EXPORT-LED GROWTH REGIMES IN CENTRAL AND SOUTH
AMERICA
In the four-year growth period (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) prior to the onset of the Great Recession, the evidence available for Latin America and its sub-regions concerning the above variables suggest, in the first place, that investment increased for the region as a whole and for both sub-regions. As shown in Table 3 The available data show that the expansion of investment during this period was the largest recorded for the case of South and Central America, and that for Mexico, it is larger than that registered in the first and second half of the 1990s. This is expected, since the accelerator suggests that investment responds to higher levels of activity to adjust capacity to demand. Also in both cases, the rise in household consumption, in the case of Central America in part associated with higher levels of private debt, while in South America more dependent on social transfers and higher wages, led to an increase in output in the period 2004-2007 (and in 2008 for some countries), which also provided a further stimulus to the expansion of profits. In the case of both South and Central America, the expansion of output and profits was constrained by a policy aimed at reducing the government deficit. This allowed Central America to reach a balanced budget and South America to achieve a surplus in 2007 (0.01 percent and 0.88 percent, on average, respectively).
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In the case of Central America, the effects of the contractionary fiscal stance on profits was further compounded by a rising current account deficit (-5.5 percent and -8.6 percent, respectively (see Tables 3 and 4 ).
The debt-led and export-led growth regimes in Central America and South America were underpinned by specific and distinct financing patterns. This can be seen by rearranging equation (13), so that private sector expenditure ሺߨ ‫ݓ‬ ሻെ (ܿ ݅ ) is made equal to the government (݃ െ ߬)and the current account balance ൫݁(݉ െ ‫)ݔ‬൯ǤWe obtain:
In the case of Central America during the 2004-2007 period, the current account balance was negative, and in addition, greater in absolute value than the government balance. As a result, the private sector balance was also in deficit. In addition, over this period, both the external and private sector deficits widened. In fact, by 2007, the government's balance was nil on average and, thus, the private sector deficit basically equaled the external sector deficit. 20 In other words, what allowed the expansion of private domestic demand were the external financial inflows, in the same way that the expansion of consumption in parts of the European periphery were predicated on financial inflows from the central countries in the eurozone (Pérez Caldentey and Vernengo 2012).
Contrarily in the case of South America, the private sector was, on average, in a surplus position throughout the period. This outcome resulted initially from the combination of a positive result in the external sectorሺ ݁(݉ െ ‫)ݔ‬ > 0) combined with a budget deficit ((݃ െ ߬) > 0) and later on from the fact that the surplus in the external sector was greater than that in the government sector. Further, in South America, the expansion of real wages and, in some cases, social transfers allowed for the expansion of domestic demand, which did not lead to external problems, since the commodity cushioned the effects of the expansion on the external accounts.
Both Central and South American cases are summarized below:
Where | | denotes absolute value. As a result, in the case of Central America, maintaining a given level of profits through consumption expenditures required access to sufficient levels of liquidity to offset the internal and external financing gaps. This made Central America dependent on the one hand on external inflows and, on the other, on the elasticity of the banking system to provide the required levels of credit and finance.
20 See Godley (1999) and Terzi (2010) for an analysis and key insights on the relationship between the government and private sector balances. We cannot stress sufficiently the importance of the external sector in determining the final impact of a crisis or the efficiency of a given policy. Godley and Cripps (1983, p. 283) argue that: "in the long run fiscal policy can only be used to sustain growth of real income and output provided that foreign trade performance so permits. This is the most important practical conclusion of our book." We think that in the context of the crisis, the example of Central America shows that government expenditure can actually prevent the build-up of debt in the private sector and, thus, the whole process of deleveraging that followed. We also think that the analysis here presented complements a more short-run and sectoral perspective of Thirlwall's balance of payment constrained framework (e.g. McCombie and Thirlwall 1994) . 
THE IMPACT OF THE CRISIS AND THE STRUCTURE OF AGGREGATE DEMAND
The impact and intensity of the Global Crisis on Latin American economies are directly related to the type of growth regimes and its underlying financing patterns. The crisis was initially felt in the external sector through a significant drop in financial inflows and an increase in profit remittances (outflows). For the region, as a whole, the surplus in the financial account of the balance of payments declined on average from 4. The process of deleveraging occurred in both South and Central America, as this is a normal process that accompanies the recomposition of portfolios that occurs during a crisis and the concomitant adjustment. This is illustrated using the example Global Crisis for Central and South America with a four quadrant figure combining the surplus (deficit) of the government with that of the external sector in Figures 5A and 5B (Kregel 2011) . 
Central America 2009
Source: Based on Kregel (2011) .
By definition, and following from equation (13) Table 5 ). In the second place, contrarily to the boom and bust view of the cycle, the reduction or outright contraction in credit is a product of the decline in output. In other words the behavior of credit is endogenously determined. Indeed Granger causality tests reject the null hypothesis that GDP growth does not cause credit growth in all cases considered, while the same cannot be said of the opposite chain of causation for the cases of Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Nicaragua (Table   6 ). It is important to understand that fiscal restraint during the boom, a trade mark of the boom and bust equilibrium view of cycles, was not instrumental in avoiding the crisis. In fact, in Central America, the efforts to reduce the deficit reflected in the nearly balanced fiscal accounts on average before the crisis forced the private sector into deficits, which are, from a general point of view, less sustainable than public deficits, since public spending, contrary to private spending, has a direct impact on public revenue through the multiplier process, and are incurred in a token 21 The rate of return over equity (ROE) equals the product of the ratio of earnings to assets (or rate of return over assets, i.e., ROA) and assets to equity (or leverage, i.e., L). That is, In the case of South America, the maintenance of fiscal surpluses during the boom and before the crisis, which has been described as a precondition for creating fiscal space and allowing for a big fiscal swing during the crisis without threatening fiscal sustainability, in many cases simply led to a lower rate of growth during the boom (Brazil and Chile come to mind as examples) than would have been possible given the extraordinary external conditions associated with the commodity boom. This is, in fact, a recurrent problem for Latin American countries that have a tendency to cool down the economy prematurely during booms. 22 The traditional view about the business cycle, with the idea that managing the booms is necessary to smooth out the cycle, in our view, is part of the problem.
CONCLUSION
Conventional wisdom about the business cycle in Latin America assumes that monetary shocks cause deviations from the optimal path, and that the triggering factor in the cycle is excess credit and liquidity. Further, in this view, the origin of the contraction is ultimately related to the excesses during the expansion. For that reason, it follows that avoiding the worst conditions during the bust entails applying restrictive economic policies during the expansion in the business cycle, including reigning in government expenditures and reducing liquidity to private agents.
Here we develop an alternative approach that suggests that fiscal restraint does not have a significant impact in reducing the risks of a crisis, and that excessive fiscal conservatism might actually exacerbate problems. In the case of Central America, the contractive fiscal stance, in conjunction with the persistent current account deficits, implied that financial inflows, with remittances being particularly important in some cases, allowed for an expansion of a private 22 Pérez Caldentey and Pineda (2010) show that for Latin America and the Caribbean, lack of convergence with advanced economies results mainly from weak expansions. In comparison to other regions, Latin America and the Caribbean have similar recessions, in profundity and duration, and also tend to recover quickly. Contrarily, during expansions, Latin America and the Caribbean tend to perform below the world and other developing regions' averages. Latin America and the Caribbean countries are, from a regional comparative perspective, "good" at withstanding the negative effects of contractions and "bad" at taking advantage of expansions to achieve convergence with the developed world.
spending boom that proved unsustainable once the Great Recession led to a sharp fall in external funds.
In the case of South America, the commodity boom created conditions for growth without hitting the external constraint, a situation that has had no recent parallel, and that has for the most part permitted relatively high levels of growth associated not only with higher exports but also with the expansion of domestic markets, in part as a result of higher wages and higher levels of social transfers. Fiscal restraint in the South American context has resulted, in some cases, in lower rates of growth than what otherwise would have been possible as a result of the absence of an external constraint. Yet, the lower reliance on external funds made the region less vulnerable and more resilient to the external shock waves of the Great Recession than Central American economies. That is not to say that the strategy of development in South America is devoid of risks. Reprimarization of exports and dependence on commodities are still a significant problem, and pose difficult challenges for policy makers in the region.
